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Abstract 
After more than two decades of transition and integration, countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
still exhibit income levels that are significantly lower than the European Union (EU) average. This paper 
examines convergence in per-capita GDP between CEE and the EU over the period 1990-2012 by 
employing a combination of parametric and nonparametric methods, which provide more detailed insights 
than previous studies. The results indicate that the first decade of transition has been marked by 
divergence from the EU benchmark. In contrast, CEE countries experienced strong convergence over the 
2000s, even in the face of the global financial crisis. However, the distribution of relative income evolved 
from a unimodal to a multimodal one, revealing growing disparities within CEE. Human capital 
accumulation and progress in economic reforms are identified as the key determinants of convergence, 
while financial deepening and price instability had a negative effect, especially in the past decade.   
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1. Introduction 
Almost a quarter of a century has passed since the start of the transition towards democracy 
and a market economy in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In the process of shedding the 
legacy of the planned economy in the early 1990s, countries in the region were facing similar 
problems due to the shared political and economic system shaped for decades by Communist 
ideology. Accordingly, they adopted similar economic reforms aimed at establishing functioning 
market economies and collectively suffered a severe decline in aggregate output during this 
period. However, disparities in their initial conditions and in the sequencing, speed, and depth of 
reform implementation produced vastly different results across CEE. While some countries, like 
the Czech Republic, have managed to almost completely overcome the burden of their 
Communist past, others, like Belarus, still exhibit many of the traits of a state-run economy.  
By creating a democratic society and a market economy, CEE countries also hoped to restore 
and deepen their integration with the advanced economies in Western Europe via accession to 
the European Union (EU). In 2004, the first group of Central European and Baltic countries 
joined the organization, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and Croatia in 2013. At the 
same time, four countries (Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, and Latvia) have taken their integration a 
step further by adopting the euro as their national currency when they became members of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). Despite these milestones in their development, CEE 
countries have ranked as the poorest members of the EU. As shown in Fig. 1, even the best 
performing economies in Central Europe had a mean per-capita income that was about 60% of 
the EU average in 2012, while those of Bulgaria and Romania were even less than 40%. The 
economic boom in CEE during the early and mid-2000s offered hope for a more rapid 
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convergence, but the global economic crisis and the European debt crises in 2008-2010 resulted 
in a serious setback for some countries in the region.    
 
Fig. 1: Per-capita income in CEE (% of EU average), 1990-2012 
 
Note: Central Europe includes Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The 
Baltics include Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Eastern Europe consists of Belarus, Moldovia, and Ukraine. 
The Western Balkans include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. 
 
The main goal of this paper is to examine the process of convergence between CEE and the 
EU over the entire period of transition. In particular, we use a combination of parametric and 
nonparametric methods to study the distributional dynamics of real per-capita GDP for 19 CEE 
countries relative to the EU average over the period 1990-2012. We construct kernel density 
distributions and analyze the evolution in their shape to trace convergence tendencies. Next, we 
employ Markov transition matrices and stochastic kernels to investigate the intradistributional 
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dynamics and to estimate the probabilities of CEE countries’ per-capita income convergence or 
divergence from the EU benchmark. Lastly, regression analysis enables us to identify the various 
factors that contributed to or impaired convergence over the sample period.  
There is a vast literature on various aspects of convergence between CEE and the EU, 
including convergence in industrial output, prices, and interest rates (Brada, Kutan, and Zhou, 
2005; Figuet and Nenovsky, 2006; Kasman, Kirbat-Kasman and Turgutlu, 2005; Kutan and Yigit, 
2005), inflation (Becker and Hall, 2009; Drine and Rault, 2006; Nath and Tochkov, 2013), 
supply and demand shocks (Babetskii, Boone and Maurel, 2004; Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2003), 
and fiscal (Ayala and Blazsek, 2012; Kocenda, Kutan, and Yigit, 2008) and monetary policy 
(Brada and Kutan, 2001).1 The papers dedicated to convergence in per-capita income can be 
divided into two groups. The first one employs growth regressions to estimate the presence of β- 
and σ-convergence. Matkowski and Prochniak (2007) provide evidence for both types of 
convergence between the EU and the eight CEE countries that joined the organization in 2004, 
whereby the catching up appears to have been more intense in the late 1990s and early 2000s as 
compared to earlier years. Vojinovic, Oplotnik, and Prochniak (2010) report very similar results 
for the same sample over the years 1996-2006. Szeles and Marinescu (2010) show that absolute 
convergence is significant only after adding Bulgaria and Romania to the sample, which also 
strengthens the conditional convergence of the entire CEE region. The work of Rapacki and 
Prochniak (2009) is the most comprehensive in terms of its sample of 27 transition economies 
and its time frame (1990-2005).2 The authors fail to find evidence of convergence for the entire 
sample and time period, but certain subsamples (e.g., the eight Central European countries) and 
1 Kocenda (2001) and Kutan and Yigit (2004) explore real and nominal convergence within the group of CEE 
countries, rather than between CEE and the EU. 
2 Their sample includes not only CEE but also all former Soviet republics, even those in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia. 
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certain subperiods (e.g., 2000-2005) exhibit strong and significant β- and σ-convergence 
tendencies.  
The second group of papers seeks to detect stochastic convergence by applying variations of 
the unit root tests. For instance, Tsanana and Katrakilidis (2013) report limited income 
convergence among eight Balkan countries and between them and the EU average over the 
period 1994-2011. Similarly, Tsanana, Katrakilidis, and Pantelidis (2013) show that in 
Southeastern Europe only Slovenia and Greece exhibit convergence with the EU benchmark over 
the years 1989-2009.   
The majority of previous studies have in common that they use parametric methodologies 
with a focus on the first two moments of the income distribution. The sign, magnitude, and 
significance of a single parameter are relied upon to determine the presence or lack of 
convergence. In contrast, the nonparametric approach applied in this paper explores the entire 
distribution of per-capita GDP and provides a much more detailed view of convergence 
dynamics within the CEE sample as well as between CEE and the EU. We also estimate directly 
the effects of the factors that drive or impair convergence, whereas the existing literature 
concentrates exclusively on the determinants of growth rather than convergence. Moreover, 
existing studies mostly limit their sample to EU members in CEE or other specific groups of 
countries, whereas we include all CEE countries, even though some of them are at the very early 
stages of accession talks and association agreements with the EU. An additional advantage of our 
analysis is that it examines the impact of the recent global economic crisis and European debt 
crisis on convergence between CEE and the EU. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2 and 3 explain the methodology and data 
sources, respectively. Section 4 reports the results, and section 5 concludes. 
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 2. Methodology  
In a series of seminal papers, Quah (1993, 1996a, b, 1997) criticized the standard 
econometric approaches to income convergence, arguing that their focus on the first (β-
convergence) and second (σ-convergence) moments of the income distribution describe the 
dynamics of a representative economy but fail to characterize the evolution of the entire income 
distribution over time. Instead, he proposed a new methodology that uses kernel density 
estimates to examine the shape of the income distribution and transition probability functions to 
investigate distributional dynamics and intra-distributional mobility. This approach is 
particularly suitable for the study of relative income convergence in CEE because of the 
heterogeneity across transition economies. 
The nonparametric part of the analysis begins with the estimation of the probability density 
function of relative per-capita income using a kernel function. Let X1,…,Xn be a sample of n 
independent and identically distributed observations on a random variable X. The density value 
f(x) at a given point x is estimated by the following kernel density estimator: 
                              𝑓(𝑥) = 1
𝑛ℎ
∑ 𝐾 �
𝑥−𝑋𝑖
ℎ
�𝑛𝑖=1                                                           (1) 
where h denotes the bandwidth of the interval around x and K is the kernel function.3 The kernel 
estimator assigns a weight to each observation in the interval around x, with the weight being 
inversely proportional to the distance between the observation and x. The density estimate 
consists of the vertical sum of frequencies at each observation. The resulting smooth curve 
allows us to visualize the shape of the distribution of relative per-capita income and detect the 
presence of “convergence clubs” represented by modes.   
3 We use data-driven bandwidth selection and a Gaussian kernel. 
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Next, we study the dynamics of the relative income distribution and intradistributional 
mobility by estimating a transition probability matrix. Let Qt denote the distribution of relative 
per-capita across CEE countries at time t. The distribution at time t+1 is then described by: 
                                                𝑄𝑡+1 = 𝑀 × 𝑄𝑡          (2) 
where M is a finite discrete first-order Markov transition matrix that contains a complete 
description of the distributional dynamics as it maps Qt into Qt+1. The transition matrix is given 
by 
                                               𝑀 = �𝑝𝑖𝑗 ⋯ 𝑝𝑖𝑁⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑝𝑁𝑗 ⋯ 𝑝𝑁𝑁
�                             (3) 
where pij with i, j=1,..,N is the probability of a transition from an initial state i at time t to a state 
j at time t+1. The main diagonal of the matrix consists of the probabilities that an observation 
remains in the same state in t and t+1.  
Assuming that the transition probabilities from t to t+1 are time-invariant and independent of 
any previous transitions, the evolution of intradistributional mobility can be studied by iterating 
Eq. (2) k times. As k→∞, the iteration yields  
                               lim𝑘→∞𝑀𝑗𝑘 = 𝛿𝑗 > 0,   ∑𝛿𝑗 = 1      (4) 
The limiting probability distribution, δj, is the unconditional or ergodic distribution.4 In other 
words, Eq.(4) describes the convergence to a steady-state distribution independent of the initial 
distribution. Accordingly, the ergodic distribution allows us to analyze the long-run tendencies of 
per-capita income in CEE countries relative to the EU benchmark, assuming that the observed 
dynamics continue to hold.     
4 The ergodic distribution is unique if there is only one eigenvalue of M with modulus one. 
7 
 
                                                          
The transition probability matrix approach has two major drawbacks that might distort the 
distributional dynamics. First, it uses continuous data on relative per-capita income to estimate a 
discrete model. Second, the discretization of the state space into states i and j, with i,j=1,…,N is 
somewhat arbitrary. To avoid these potential issues and test for the robustness of the results, we 
focus — in the third step of our analysis — on transition probabilities in a continuous state space 
and, following Quah (1997), estimate a stochastic kernel that maps the distribution Qt into Qt+τ as 
follows: 
                    𝑄𝑡+𝜏(𝑥𝑡+𝜏) = ∫𝑔(𝑥𝑡+𝜏|𝑥𝑡)𝑄𝑡(𝑥𝑡)𝑑𝑥                     (5) 
where the conditional density function g(xt+τ |xt) describes the probability of the transition to a 
certain state in t+τ given the initial state in t. In line with Hyndman et al. (1996), the conditional 
density is estimated using a kernel estimator given by  
                                     𝑔�(𝑥𝑡+𝜏|𝑥𝑡) = ?̂?(𝑥𝑡+𝜏,𝑥𝑡)?̂?(𝑥𝑡)                                              (6) 
where f(xt) is the marginal density from Eq. (1) and z(xt+τ ,xt) is the joint density given by                                    ?̂?(𝑥𝑡+𝜏,𝑥𝑡) = 1𝑛ℎ𝑏 ∑ 𝐾 �𝑥𝑡+𝜏−𝑋𝑖,𝑡+𝜏𝑏 �𝑛𝑖=1 �𝑥𝑡−𝑋𝑖𝑡ℎ �                 (7) 
with h and b denoting the bandwidth of the interval around xt and xt+τ respectively. The visual 
representation of the stochastic kernel produces three-dimensional graphs and two-dimensional 
contour plots. Like a Markov transition matrix, the main diagonal in these graphs indicates a lack 
of mobility across states.  
Lastly, we seek to identify the determinants of relative per-capita income growth via 
regression analysis. For this purpose, we estimate the following model: 
  ∆𝑙𝑛 �𝑦𝑖𝑡𝐶𝐸𝐸
𝑦�𝑡
𝐸𝑈 � = ∝𝑖+  𝛽1𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽8𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                    (8) 
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The dependent variable is the annual growth in real per-capita GDP of CEE country i 
(i=1,…,19) in year t as a percentage of the EU average.5 For robustness purposes and to control 
for short-run fluctuations, we also estimate the model for average annual growth over 3-year 
non-overlapping periods as the dependent variable. The regression employs country-fixed effects 
(αi) to control for the effects of unobserved confounding variables that vary across countries. All 
independent variables enter the equation at their initial level at the beginning of the period to 
minimize endogeneity issues. 
The choice of regressors is largely guided by the standard growth literature (Barro, 1991; 
Levine and Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller, 2004), although our dependent 
variable measures convergence towards the EU benchmark over time. Physical (K) and human 
capital (HK) accumulation increase labor productivity and promote economic growth, which can 
lead to convergence if the growth rate in CEE is higher than the EU average. For similar reasons, 
we include innovation (R&D). External forces are represented by openness (OPEN) and foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Economic policy is accounted for by fiscal (GOV) and monetary (MON) 
variables, while financial deepening (FIN) and the exchange rate regime (FX) focus on the role 
of financial factors. Institutions are represented by the progress of economic reforms (REF). 
Furthermore, we include dummy variables for the years in which a CEE country was a member 
of the EU (EU) and for the years of the global and debt crises (CRIS).         
 
3. Data 
The sample covers 19 countries in CEE over the period 1990-2012. Per-capita GDP is 
measured according to purchasing power parity in constant 2005 international dollars. Physical 
5 The EU average is calculated using data from all EU member countries except for those from CEE, Cyprus, and 
Malta. Moreover, for the sake of consistency, the average includes the same countries for all years of the sample 
period, although some of them had not yet joined the EU in the early 1990s.     
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capital accumulation is measured as gross fixed capital formation. Innovation is represented by 
the expenditure on research and development (R&D), while fiscal policy is approximated by 
government consumption spending. Openness is calculated as the sum of exports and imports. 
FDI is expressed as net inflows. Financial deepening is proxied by domestic credit to the private 
sector. All of the above variables are expressed as percentage of GDP. Monetary factors are 
approximated by price instability measured as the annual rate of CPI inflation. The 
aforementioned variables were collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database. Human capital is represented by average years of total schooling for individuals aged 
15 years and above, which are obtained from Barro and Lee (2013).6 The effects of the exchange 
rate regime are controlled for by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country 
adopted a fixed exchange rate, and 0 otherwise. Membership in the EU is also a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if a CEE country joined the organization, and 0 otherwise. We adopt the 
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) transition indicator to measure the 
progress of economic reforms. This indicator consists of five components (large-scale 
privatization, small-scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price 
liberalization, trade and exchange rate liberalization, and competition policy), with progress 
measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 4. We combine all components into an average composite 
score by assigning equal weights to each of them.7  
The descriptive statistics for all variables in the regression analysis are shown in Table 1. The 
average per-capita income in CEE was 34% of the EU average. All variables, except for 
government consumption and inflation, increased between the first and second decades of the 
sample period. Annual growth was negative over the years 1990-2000 when most CEE countries 
6 The average years of schooling are reported in 5-year intervals. We use interpolation to fill in the missing data for 
the years in between.  
7 The Czech Republic “graduated” from EBRD operations in 2007 and thus no data are available for later years. 
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experienced a steep decline in output, but their performance turned positive in the following 
decade.            
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
    
1990-
2012   
1990-
2000   
2001-
2012 
Real per-capita GDP    
(% of EU average)   
33.88 
(16.50)  
30.83 
(15.26)  
36.67 
(17.12) 
       
Annual growth of 
relative p.c. GDP  
0.82 
(8.53)  
-1.74 
(10.89)  
3.38 
(3.76) 
 
       
Fixed capital formation       
(% of GDP)   
22.30 
(5.50)  
20.94 
(5.77)  
23.41 
(5.01) 
        
Human capital               
(avg. years of 
schooling) 
  10.56 (1.64)  
10.03 
(1.52)  
11.05 
(1.58) 
        
Openness                         
(trade as % of GDP)   
104.55 
(32.48)  
92.66 
(32.40)  
114.16 
(29.26) 
        
FDI                                 
(% of GDP)   
4.69 
(5.74)  
2.76 
(2.53)  
6.04 
(6.87) 
        
Fiscal policy (gov. 
consum. as % of GDP)   
9.66 
(3.31)  
10.43 
(3.45)  
8.87 
(2.97) 
        
Monetary policy                               
(CPI inflation in %)   
60.75 
(307.55)  
141.34 
(475.46)  
6.90 
(10.20) 
        
Financial deepening 
(priv. lending as % of 
GDP) 
  37.60 (23.25)  
25.64 
(18.85)  
45.21 
(22.60) 
        
Economic reforms                   
(EBRD transition score)   
2.99 
(0.82)  
2.53 
(0.84)  
3.41 
(0.53) 
        
Innovation                              
(R&D as % of GDP)   
0.75 
(0.39)  
0.75 
(0.28)  
0.75 
(0.43) 
Nr. of observations   437   209   228 
Note: The reported numbers are averages across all countries and years. Standard                          
deviations are in parenthesis. 
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 4. Results 
4.1. Distribution dynamics 
The density distributions of relative per-capita GDP are presented in Fig. 2. The three-
dimensional graphs on the left show the changes in the shape of the distribution over the entire 
sample period, while the two-dimensional plots provide snapshots for specific years. The graphs 
in the first and second row of Fig. 2 focus on the 1990s and 2000s, respectively. 
At the start of the transition in 1990, the density distribution was unimodal, with most of the 
probability mass concentrated in the range between 30% and 60% of the EU average. Over the 
following five years, there is a clear shift of the distribution to the left, signifying divergence 
from the benchmark. In addition, a decrease in the dispersion of relative per-capita GDP 
produces a peak at around 20%-30% of the EU average, while a minor mode emerges at the 60% 
level. By the end of the first decade, there are some indications of convergence as the probability 
mass expands to the right, thereby reducing the height of the peak and absorbing the smaller 
mode.  
The observed divergence over the 1990s coincides with the most difficult period of the 
transition in CEE, when many economies in the region experienced severe crises and initiated 
painful reforms that resulted in a dramatic fall in aggregate output. The weak convergence 
tendency of the late 1990s reflects the eventual success of these reforms in generating growth 
that allowed CEE countries to recover and begin catching up with the EU, albeit at a slow pace.    
The distributional dynamics in the 2000s present a very different picture. There is a 
continuous shift of the distribution to the right, marking the convergence between CEE and the 
EU benchmark. At the same time, the widening of the main mode reveals a growing dispersion  
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Fig. 2: Kernel density distributions of relative GDP per capita (% of EU average), 1990-2012 
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that results in the transformation of the unimodal into a multimodal distribution. The relatively 
high degree of smoothing in the two-dimensional plot conceals this tendency, but it can be 
observed on the corresponding three-dimensional graph. The single peak gradually dissipates and 
is replaced by a myriad of lesser modes. Although most of the probability mass has moved to the 
range between 40% and 70% of the EU average, a number of countries have remained at levels 
of between 10% and 30%.  These include mostly countries in the Western Balkans, such as 
Bosnia and Macedonia, as well as former Soviet republics, such as Ukraine and Moldova. 
Although they experienced an increase in relative per-capita GDP, the speed of convergence was 
moderate in comparison, confining them to the bottom of the distribution. For instance, 
Macedonia recorded a 27% rise in its relative standing over the period 2001-2012, far behind 
Lithuania’s 72% or Bulgaria’s 51%. On the other end of the spectrum, countries like Slovenia 
and the Czech Republic achieved per-capita income levels of more than 70% of the EU average 
in recent years, thereby surpassing established EU members, such as Greece and Portugal, which 
were adversely affected by the debt crisis.  
Interestingly, the global economic crisis and the European debt crisis have largely failed to 
slow down the overall convergence of CEE. The graph at the bottom of Fig. 2 shows only a very 
minor shift of the distribution to the left in 2009 and 2010. On the one hand, the crises devastated 
the economies of several EU countries causing the EU average to decrease and thus making it 
easier for CEE countries to catch up. On the other hand, some CEE countries, such as Poland, 
avoided a downturn and remained resilient throughout the crisis, while others like Romania and 
Latvia received generous financial assistance from the IMF and the EU, which prevented a major 
decline in their relative standing. 
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4.2. Intradistributional dynamics 
The transition matrices in Table 2 reveal the dynamics within the distribution of relative per-
capita GDP. Each matrix consists of four states, with ranges chosen so as to contain 
approximately the same number of observations. The initial states are displayed on the left, while 
the final states are in the top bar. The numbers in the matrix represent probabilities associated 
with moving from an initial to a final state. The diagonal embodies the persistence in the same 
state. Numbers below the diagonal indicate the likelihood of divergence, whereas the ones above 
measure the probability of convergence.  
The first matrix in Table 2 uses annual transitions over the entire sample period. The 
persistence in the same initial state is above 90% and is identical at both ends of the distribution. 
In other words, countries with per-capita GDP of less than 23% and more than 45% of the EU 
average had little chance of changing their relative standing in the course of a year. In the middle 
of the distribution, the mobility is higher, but the chance of moving towards or diverging from 
the EU benchmark is almost the same. If sustained in the long run, these dynamics would have 
produced a bimodal ergodic distribution shown at the bottom of the matrix. Twenty-four percent 
of the observations would have ended up in the bottom mode, while 33% would have 
concentrated at levels above 45% of the EU average.  
We test the robustness of our results by extending the transition period to 3 years. This 
causes the mobility across states to increase dramatically, except at the top of the distribution, 
where it remains constant at above 90%. Countries with relative per-capita income below 45% 
have a 17% to 20% chance of converging towards the EU benchmark, while the probability of 
divergence is between 11% and 15%. In the long run, these convergence tendencies yield a 
unimodal ergodic distribution with a peak at the top and a long tail on the left. In general, this  
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Table 2: Markov transition matrices and ergodic distributions 
Annual transitions, 1990-2012 
State               [4.1; 22.6)   [22.6; 30.5)    [30.5; 44.6)    [44.6; 77.8]       n 
[4.1; 22.6) 0.93 0.07 0.00 0.00            104 
[22.6; 30.5) 0.06 0.87 0.08 0.00            105 
[30.5; 44.6) 0.01 0.09 0.82 0.09            104 
[44.6; 77.8] 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.93            105 
Ergodic 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.33            418 
          3-year transitions, 1990-2012 
State               [4.1; 22.1)   [22.1; 29.5)    [29.5; 44.3)    [44.3; 77.8]       n 
[4.1; 22.1) 0.83 0.17 0.00 0.00             95 
[22.1; 29.5) 0.11 0.69 0.20 0.00             95 
[29.5; 44.3) 0.03 0.12 0.65 0.20             95 
[44.3; 77.8] 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.92             95 
Ergodic 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.46            380 
           Annual transitions, 1990-2000 
State               [4.1; 21.7)   [21.7; 28.2)    [28.2; 41.0)    [41.0; 68.3]       n 
[4.1; 21.7) 0.96 0.04 0.00 0.00             47 
[21.7; 28.2) 0.06 0.89 0.04 0.00             47 
[28.2; 41.0) 0.04 0.15 0.77 0.04             48 
[41.0; 68.3] 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.87             48 
Ergodic 0.58 0.32 0.08 0.03            190 
                 Annual transitions, 2001-2012 
State               [4.1; 23.1)   [23.1; 32.9)    [32.9; 48.3)    [48.3; 77.8]       n 
[4.1; 23.1) 0.90 0.08 0.02 0.00             52 
[23.1; 32.9) 0.00 0.89 0.11 0.00             53 
[32.9; 48.3) 0.00 0.02 0.83 0.15             52 
[48.3; 77.8] 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.94             52 
Ergodic 0.00 0.05 0.27 0.68            209 
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mirrors the ergodic distribution of the annual transitions matrix except that the lesser mode at the 
bottom has dissipated due to the higher mobility directed towards the top.             
The matrices for the two subperiods again exhibit opposite patterns. Over the 1990-2000 
period, the likelihood of divergence from the EU average was higher than of convergence. In the 
long run, this causes almost 60% of observations to end up with relative per-capita income of 
below 22%. Accordingly, the ergodic distribution is unimodal and skewed to the right. In the 
years 2001-2012, the probability of divergence is only between 2% and 6% allowing the 
majority of countries to improve their relative standing. This convergence produces again a 
unimodal ergodic distribution, which is now skewed to the left. In the long run, almost 70% of 
observations would achieve a per-capita GDP of at least 48% of the EU average, while only 5% 
would have a relative level of less than 33%.  
We conduct an additional robustness check by estimating stochastic kernels that relax the 
assumption of a state space that consist of only 4 ranges. We use 3-year transitions and display 
the results in Fig. 3. The three-dimensional graphs and the corresponding two-dimensional 
contour plots are based on the same principle as the transition matrices, with the diagonal 
signifying persistence while a concentration of lines above (below) the diagonal is interpreted as 
convergence (divergence). The horizontal axis of the contour plots denotes the initial state of 
relative income at time t, and the vertical axis shows the corresponding level 3 years later (t+3).  
The results are mostly in line with the findings above. The wider dispersion of the lines on 
both sides of the diagonal for the first decade of the sample period reveals higher levels of 
mobility, which corresponds to the alternating divergence and convergence tendencies observed 
in Fig. 2. In contrast, the contour plots for the entire sample period and the second subperiod 
show much less dispersion, but the higher concentration of lines above the diagonal is indicative  
17 
 
Fig. 3: Stochastic kernels of relative GDP per capita, 3-year transitions, 1990-2012 
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of convergence. This finding again concurs with the conclusions from the transition matrix 
analysis. In addition, the stochastic kernels provide more details that remain concealed by the 
discrete state space of the transition matrices. For instance, in the first decade of the sample 
period countries that initially had a relative per-capita GDP of around 50% recorded a 
significantly higher chance of moving towards lower income levels in the following 3 years than 
their counterparts at both ends of the distribution. 
 
4.3. Determinants of relative per-capita income growth   
The factors that drive the distributional and intradistributional dynamics described in the 
previous two sections are explored via regression analysis. The results for several specifications 
of the fixed-effects model over the entire sample period are shown in Table 3, with the first two 
columns focusing on annual growth and the last two using average annual growth over 3-year 
non-overlapping periods. We should note again that the dependent variable is the growth of real 
per-capita GDP of CEE countries not in absolute terms but relative to the EU average. In other 
words, the dependent variable measures income convergence (or divergence) between CEE and 
the EU over time.     
The estimates in Table 3 suggest that human capital is one of the key driving forces behind 
convergence. In the growth literature, human capital accumulation is one of the few factors that 
have been found to have a positive and robust effect on growth (Sala-I-Martin, Doppelhofer, and 
Miller, 2004; Henderson and Russell, 2005). In the case of CEE countries, we establish that 
average years of schooling not only promote subsequent economic growth but also convergence 
towards the EU average per-capita income. In other words, human capital enabled CEE to grow  
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Table 3: Regression results for relative per-capita GDP growth, 1990-2012 
 Annual growth 3-year average growth 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Fixed capital formation -0.194** (0.081) 
-0.192** 
(0.048) 
-0.467*** 
(0.100) 
-0.478*** 
(0.103) 
Human capital                5.596*** (1.593) 
3.351** 
(1.356)  
3.648 
(2.699) 
0.500 
(2.507) 
Openness                          0.014 (0.026)  
0.007 
(0.039)  
FDI  0.029 (0.051) 
0.039 
(0.050) 
0.048 
(0.079) 
0.035 
(0.085) 
Fiscal policy  0.024 (0.171)  
0.201 
(0.152) 
-0.055 
(0.567) 
0.681 
(0.537) 
Price instability                                -0.004 (0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.088** 
(0.042) 
-0.141*** 
(0.041) 
Financial deepening  -0.088*** (0.028)  
-0.099** 
(0.044)  
Fixed exchange rate   1.031 (1.637) 
1.184 
(1.407) 
2.021 
(2.108) 
-1.415 
(1.926) 
Economic reforms                     5.316*** (1.622) 
5.277*** 
(1.628) 
6.538*** 
(2.165) 
4.845** 
(2.185) 
Innovation                                -1.935 (1.937) 
-4.708*** 
(1.692) 
-1.696 
(2.622) 
-6.400*** 
(2.118) 
EU membership  0.379 (1.109)  
-1.148 
(1.497)  
Global/debt crisis -1.923** (0.862) 
-2.962*** 
(0.800) 
-0.840 
(1.092) 
-0.216 
(1.031) 
Log likelihood function -592.86 -606.27 -98.10 -109.54 
Nr. Of observations 418 418 114 114 
Note:  All independent variables are measured at their initial levels at the beginning                                  
of each growth period. All specifications include country-fixed effects. Standard                                   
errors are in parenthesis. *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.10 
 
more rapidly than the EU benchmark. However, this effect seems to be limited to the short run 
because the coefficient lacks significance once growth is extended to 3-year periods. 
In contrast, our results show that gross fixed capital formation had an adverse effect on 
convergence. As with human capital, physical capital accumulation is usually exerts a positive 
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influence on growth (Prochniak, 2011). Therefore, our estimates mean that the investments made 
in CEE countries were not capable of producing growth that exceeded the one in the EU. This 
finding may indicate that investment spending in CEE was either insufficient or inefficient or 
both. The lack of fixed capital formation has been particularly evident in the first decade of 
transition (see Table 1) as state-owned enterprises that had dominated the economy were closed 
down, restructured, or privatized. In addition, rampant corruption, wasteful use of resources, 
rigged government tenders for public projects, poor quality, and misguided investment priorities 
have certainly diminished the effectiveness of invested funds in promoting growth.  
Our results further identify economic reforms and liberalization measures as the other key 
contributor to convergence. Previous studies provide mixed evidence on the growth effects of 
privatization, price and trade liberalization, and demonopolization. Lawson and Wang (2004) 
reported a negative effect on growth and convergence speed for all components of the EBRD 
transition indicator except trade liberalization over the period 1991-2000. In contrast, Fidrmuc 
(2003), Falcetti, Lysenko, and Sanfey (2006), and Prochniak (2011) discovered a positive growth 
effect over the same period, while Radulescu and Barlow (2002) failed to find any robust link. 
We use a significantly longer sample period and focus on growth relative to the EU average. In 
this framework, progress in the transition from a planned to a market economy has delivered an 
economic performance that has allowed CEE to catch up with the EU average. Moreover, this 
effect appears to be sustainable as it extends to 3-year periods of growth as well.  
Financial deepening is shown to promote divergence, both in the short and in medium terms. 
Between 2003 and 2008, most CEE countries experienced an unprecedented credit boom with 
double digit increases in private lending as a share of GDP. Growth was fueled by large inflows 
resulting from the high liquidity on global markets that was channeled into CEE via foreign-
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owned banks that dominate the financial sector in many countries in the region (Aydin, 2008; 
Kongsamut and Vandenbussche, 2013). Accordingly, we would have expected the sign for the 
coefficient of financial deepening to be positive. However, the credit boom turned to a bust as 
soon as the global crisis hit the region in 2008-2009. Countries, such as Ukraine, Slovenia, and 
the Baltics, which had seen private credit growth of over 40% in the years 2003-2008, were also 
the ones that experienced a drop or a slowdown in the convergence of their per-capita GDP 
relative to the EU average. The dummy for the global and debt crises also indicates that during 
this period CEE countries diverged on average from the EU benchmark. The cyclical nature of 
the crises is evident from the lack of significance for the coefficient in the 3-year periods 
specification. This is in line with our finding in the nonparametric part of the analysis that 
showed convergence to be generally unaffected by the crises.            
Once growth is extended over 3-year periods, the effects of fixed capital formation, financial 
deepening, and economic reforms remain robust, whereas human capital and the crisis dummy 
become insignificant. Price instability is the only variable that turns significant over the medium 
term. In particular, increases in price instability cause relative per-capita income in CEE to 
diverge from the EU average. Inflation is more generally a sign of macroeconomic instability, 
especially in CEE where hyperinflation has resulted from price liberalization as well as from 
banking and financial crises. It is, therefore, not unexpected that this instability retards the 
narrowing of disparities between CEE and the EU.    
 Surprisingly, EU membership does not appear to have led to convergence, despite the 
substantial amounts of financial funds from the EU budget destined for CEE. The specific goal 
for most of these funds is to decrease the income gap across EU countries by fostering regional 
economic development and convergence. For instance, the Cohesion Fund provides financial 
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support in the areas of trans-European transportation and environment to those EU members with 
per-capita income of less than 90% of the EU average, making CEE countries the main 
beneficiaries. Our findings most likely results from the fact that only a quarter of the sample are 
EU members, which acceded relatively late in the sample period resulting in few observations. 
Furthermore, only a few years after these countries joined the organization, the global and debt 
crises inflicted a setback on their convergence ambitions, especially in the Baltics.   
The results of the regression by subperiod, reported in Table 4, reveal several differences 
between the first and second decades. Human capital exhibits a positive and robust effect only in 
the years 1990-2001. Similarly, the adverse effect of financial deepening is significant only for 
the second decade of the sample period, which supports our interpretation above that it is 
associated with the credit boom and bust in the 2000s. Openness, which was not significant over 
the entire sample period, is found to exert a positive influence on convergence in the second 
decade. Moreover, fixed exchange rates appear to have helped CEE countries improve their 
relative per-capita income standing only in the first subperiod.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Integration with the EU has been one of the major goals of economic transition in CEE over 
the past two decades. A number of countries in the region have succeeded in joining the EU, 
while others are hoping to become members in the near future. However, despite the deepening 
integration, CEE countries still rank at the bottom in per-capita income terms. This paper 
examines convergence patterns and tendencies between CEE and the EU average per-capita GDP 
over the period 1990-2012. In contrast to previous works, we use a combination of parametric 
and nonparametric methods, which enables us to study the dynamics of the entire income  
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Table 4: Regression results for relative annual per-capita GDP growth by subperiod 
  1990-2001 2002-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Fixed capital formation -0.743*** (0.167) 
-0.828*** 
(0.168) 
-0.636** 
(0.261) 
-0.164** 
(0.078) 
-0.152 
(0.092) 
-0.250*** 
(0.090) 
Human capital                6.646*** (1.837) 
5.812** 
(2.450) 
9.756* 
(5.235) 
0.233 
(1.310) 
2.663 
(2.012) 
5.323** 
(2.391) 
Openness                          -0.031 (0.031) 
-0.040 
(0.030) 
0.002 
(0.059) 
0.085*** 
(0.029) 
0.074** 
(0.033) 
0.073** 
(0.033) 
FDI  -0.110 (0.235) 
-0.274 
(0.254)  
0.016 
(0.046) 
0.016 
(0.050) 
0.007 
(0.050) 
Fiscal policy  -0.038 (0.296)   
0.339** 
(0.146) 
0.258 
(0.166) 
0.081 
(0.176) 
Price instability                                -0.004*** (0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.114*** 
(0.031) 
-0.161*** 
(0.039) 
-0.124*** 
(0.042) 
Financial deepening  -0.004 (0.046) 
0.117* 
(0.069) 
-0.006 
(0.065)   
-0.109*** 
(0.035) 
Fixed exchange rate    8.721* (4.592)  
 -0.025 
(1.779) 
-0.145 
(1.791) 
0.394 
(1.926) 
Economic reforms                     
2.921 
(2.254)   
-7.444* 
(3.799) 
-3.156 
(4.177) 
Innovation                                 
1.133 
(5.579)  
-2.441 
(2.239) 
0.274 
(2.506) 
EU membership      
-0.864  
(0.928)   
Global/debt crisis    -1.832*** (0.676) 
-2.202*** 
(0.809)  
Log likelihood function -352.07 -330.25 -174.86 -482.47 -414.41 -406.59 
Nr. Of observations 209 209 209 209 209 209 
Note:  All independent variables are measured at their initial levels at the beginning of each growth period. 
All specifications include country-fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * 
p<.10 
 
distribution in CEE relative to the EU benchmark and to identify the factors that contribute to or 
impair convergence.  
The results of the distributional and intradistributional analyses indicate that the early years 
of transition have been marked by income divergence from the EU average, which was only 
gradually reversed in the late 1990s. During this period, the likelihood of diverging for CEE 
countries with relative per-capita GDP of less than 40% was between one and a half and five 
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times higher than of catching up with the benchmark. This pattern would have resulted in a 
highly polarized distribution over the long run with more than half of the sample concentrated in 
the bottom tercile. Over the years 2000-2012, CEE countries experienced strong income 
convergence that would have seen almost 70% of the sample achieve per-capita GDP of more 
than half the EU average over the long run. At the same time, the relative income distribution 
over this period evolved from a unimodal to a multimodal one, revealing a growing disparity 
among the countries in the sample. Although the global and European debt crises appear to have 
had little impact on the overall convergence tendency, they exacerbated relative income 
heterogeneity across the region. 
The regression analysis shows that progress in economic reforms and human capital were the 
key determinants of convergence over the entire sample period while trade openness had a 
positive and significant effect only in the second decade. In contrast, relative income divergence 
was mainly driven by physical capital accumulation and price instability. Financial deepening 
had also a significantly adverse impact on convergence, but only in later years when the credit 
boom of the early to mid-2000s turned into bust at the start of the global crisis.    
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